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ABSTRACT 
 
The Problem of Overskilling in Australia and Britain*
 
This paper examines the parallel trends in education and labour market developments in 
Australia and Britain. It uses unique information in the WERS and HILDA surveys on reported 
overskilling in the workplace. To a degree, the overskilling information overcomes the 
problem of unobserved ability differences and focuses on the actual job-employee mismatch 
more than the conventional overeducation variables can. The paper finds that the prevalence 
of overskilling decreases with education at least for Australia, but the wage penalty 
associated with overskilling increases with education. Although the general patterns of 
overskilling (prevalence and penalties) are fairly similar between Australia and Britain, the 
problem appears to be greater in Britain. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
This paper is motivated by parallel trends in education and labour market developments 
in Australia and Britain, particularly with respect to higher education. In Australia, 
university participation rates rose from 24.4% in 1988 to 38.0% in 1999 but the increase 
was much greater for women – from 22.1% to 41.6% than for men – 27.3% to 33.2% 
(Chapman and Ryan, 2003). In Britain, the proportion of young people studying full time 
in universities increased from 13% in 1980 to 33% in 2000, with a government set target 
of 50%. Between 1990/91 and 2000/01 the number of male undergraduates increased by 
over one third and the number of females almost doubled (Elias and Purcell, 2003).1 The 
increase in the number of persons with qualifications in the labour market has given rise 
to concerns about the possibility of employer-employee mis-matches in terms of the 
failure of educated individuals to obtain jobs commensurate with their qualifications. 
Traditionally this mis-match has been called over-education and has been measured by 
the proportion of educated individuals who work in jobs where their qualifications are not 
necessary. This mis-match has been measured in terms of over-education, with a general 
over-education rate of as much as 30% of the workforce being reported in both Australia 
and Britain. A common result in the literature is that over-educated persons are also 
under-paid for their qualifications. However, doubts remain about the extent to which this 
mis-match represents a form of market failure and the extent to which it represents 
inferior quality in those individuals subject to it. One of the major problems in the 
                                                 
1 Chapman and Ryan (2003) report internal rates of return for graduates in Australia of 13.1% for men and 
12.6% for women in 1997/98, while O’Leary and Sloane (2005) report rates of return for graduates in 
England and Wales averaged over the period 1994-2002 of 10.1% for men and 15.0% for women. Thus, 
staying on represents a better investment for women in Britain than for men, while there is no discernible 
difference in Australia. 
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empirical over-education literature is that it cannot distinguish between the case where an 
observed overeducated person is (i) well-matched but paid less because there is some 
other (unobserved by the data) compensating differential at play, or (ii) not well-matched 
and therefore being paid less due to a market failure. As with many empirical 
investigations involving the estimation of the relationship between education and labour 
market performance, the inability of the over-education measures in the literature to 
account for unobserved ability introduces serious problems regarding the interpretation of 
empirical results. The fact that these two competing explanations of what over-education 
means clearly lends itself to very different policy implications, making the results from 
the over-education literature limited in their policy usefulness.  
 
This paper overcomes this problem by using a variable which measures directly and more 
generally the mismatch between employer and employee. We use information on 
reported overskilling in the workplace which is measured by employed individuals 
reporting the degree to which they utilise their skills and abilities in their workplace. To 
do this, we make use of questions in recent data sets, namely the Household, Income and 
Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) survey and the 2004 British Workplace 
Employment Relations Survey (WERS) which both ask respondents about the extent they 
are able to use their abilities and previously acquired skills on the job. This measure of 
mis-match in the workplace seems less likely to be biased through failure to control for 
unobserved ability differences. Over-education and overskilling, however, may be 
measuring different things. Green and McIntosh (2002) found, for example, that less than 
half the over-educated were also over-skilled. Using the International Adult Literacy 
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Survey (IALS) they estimated that over 20 percent of the British workforce were over-
skilled and 4 percent under-skilled, with significant wage effects for both groups. Of 
course, eliminating over-education implies moving a worker up the job hierarchy, while 
eliminating overskilling can be achieved by the employer re-organising work in existing 
jobs as well as promoting workers to higher ranked jobs. Promotion will be more easily 
achieved in well-developed internal labour markets. 
 
It has become conventional to use some version of assignment theory (Sattinger, 1993) to 
explain the existence of mis-matches in the workplace. This theory suggests that both 
demand and supply factors explain the level of wages and that, if the employers’ demand 
for different levels of skill is not matched by equivalent levels of the supply of skills, 
some mis-matching is inevitable. This will be more likely when there is rapid 
technological change as adjustment takes time, both in creating new types of skill and 
training workers in these new skills. Allen and van der Velden (2001) and Allen, Badillo-
Amador and van der Velden (2006) argue in fact that there is an implicit assumption in 
the above theory that educational mis-matches give rise to skill mis-matches and it is the 
latter that lead to negative wage effects. This in turn implies that education and skill mis-
matches should be highly correlated and that skill mis-matches should still show a 
negative effect on wages after controlling for educational mis-matches. Allen, Badillo-
Amador and van der Velden (2006) also hypothesise that educational mis-matches will be 
associated with stronger wage effects and skill mis-matches with weaker wage effects in 
those countries with strong wage setting institutions compared to countries with more 
market-based wage setting processes. They test these hypotheses on a 2005 survey of 
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graduates across nine countries (including Britain), which includes data on both 
educational and skills mis-match. In single country studies that use data sets containing 
comparable information, Allen and van der Velden (2001), Green and McIntosh (2002) 
and Di Prieto and Urwin (2006) all found that there was little support for the above 
hypotheses with skill mis-matches having little effect on wages after controlling for 
educational qualifications. These results were largely confirmed by their nine country 
study, but Britain was an exception with the strong effects of overskilling remaining and 
a sizeable decrease in the effect of over-education occurring with the introduction of the 
former. It should be noted that both Britain and Australia (which was not included in the 
above study) have market based wage setting arrangements. Neither of our two data sets 
have questions on over-education, although it is possible to derive a measure of it. 
 
One of the main questions addressed in this paper is whether there is a sizeable wage 
penalty associated with overskilling in both Britain and Australia. If we find that 
overskilling imposes a wage penalty with current graduate numbers, then this will raise 
the question of what will happen with future increases in their number to which both 
Australia and Britain are committed. This has implications both for the type of graduates 
produced and the use that is made of them by employers. Key questions are whether 
overskilling follows a similar pattern in the two countries and whether the same is true of 
the wage penalty. 
 
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the Australian and British data sets 
that are used in this paper. Section 3 investigates the relationship between over-education 
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and overskilling. As the paper argues that the overskilling question contains different 
information from what the traditional over-education variables contain, it is necessary 
that these differences be established. Section 4 presents the bulk of the estimation results. 
These contain comparisons of the wage impact of overskilling for different parts of the 
labour force in both Australia and Britain. Section 5 investigates the possible impact of 
job discretion in the presence of overskilling, using some information present in the 
British data set. Section 6 concludes. An appendix contains detailed tables. 
 
2. THE DATA 
HILDA is an annual household based panel study which began in 2001 covering 7,682 
Australian Households and 19,914 individuals in wave 1, with panel members followed 
over time. It is funded by the Australian Government through the Department of 
Families, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs, with responsibility for its design 
and management resting with a group comprising the Institute of Applied Economic and 
Social Research, University of Melbourne, the Australian Council for Educational 
Research and the Australian Institute of Family Studies. The British Workplace 
Employment Relations Survey (WERS) 2004 is a cross-section establishment-based data 
set (and the fifth in a series of surveys) which aims to provide a nationally representative 
sample of establishments to examine aspects of work inside the workplace. It is 
sponsored by the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), the Economic and Social 
Research Council (ESRC), the Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service (ACAS) 
and the Policy Studies Institute (PSI). Previous surveys were conducted in 1980, 1984, 
1990 and 1998, but only the 2004 survey contains a question on skill utilisation. WERS 
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2004 interviewed managers from 2,295 establishments with at least five employees. In 
addition, up to 25 employees at such workplaces were randomly selected for individual 
survey and asked questions about education, training, pay and job satisfaction, as well as 
a range of personal characteristics.  These two data sets are then quite different in a 
number of respects. HILDA is a panel, which means that one can examine the effect of 
past circumstances, such as previous under utilisation, on current skill utilisation, which 
is not possible in WERS. WERS, however, is a matched employer/employee survey 
which means one can examine the impact of establishment characteristics on skill 
utilisation, which is not possible in HILDA. 
 
The HILDA measure of overskilling is derived from responses scored on a seven point 
scale to the statement “I use many of my skills and abilities in my current job.” A 
response of 1 corresponds to strongly disagree and 7 to strongly agree. The WERS 
measure is derived from responses to the question “How well do the skills you personally 
have match the skills you need to do your present job?”. There is a five point scale with 
respondents answering that their own skills are much higher, a bit higher, about the same, 
a bit lower and much lower than needed. In this paper we use these two measures of 
overskilling.  Using HILDA, individuals selecting 1, 2 or 3 on the scale are classified as 
severely over-skilled, those selecting 4 or 5 as moderately over-skilled and those 
selecting 6 or 7 as well matched (the reference category in regression analysis). In the 
HILDA sample, 30.6 percent are moderately over-skilled and 11.5 percent are severely 
over-skilled. In WERS, 31.9 percent have skills a bit higher than needed in their job, and 
21.1 percent much higher than needed. Whilst moderate overskilling appears to be 
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equally prevalent in Australia and Britain, this way of cutting the data suggests a much 
higher prevalence of severe overskilling in Britain than in Australia. 
 
3. OVEREDUCATION AND OVERSKILLING 
Given the recent emphasis placed on the relationship between overeducation and 
overskilling as means for assessing theoretical models of labour markets (Allen & Van 
der Velden 2001 and 2006), we need to consider in some detail the empirical relationship 
between these two variables. The overskilling variable used in this study represents a 
more direct measure of mismatch relative to over-education, given that respondents are 
asked to benchmark directly all their skills (innate, schooling and experience-related) 
against the actual requirements of their job. Over-education, on the other hand, represents 
a much more indirect measure of mismatch as it uses educational attainment as a proxy 
for skills possessed and compares this against job entry requirements which are used to 
proxy job requirements. There are numerous reasons why the over-education proxies may 
not accurately reflect either acquired skills or job content and, as such, it is reasonable to 
expect some divergence between the over-education and overskilling estimates. 
However, a low correlation between measures does not necessarily imply inaccuracy. For 
instance, Battu, Belfield and Sloane (2000) examined the level of correlation between 
different measures of over-education derived from two separate panels of data (1985 and 
1990). Despite poor correlation between the measures (as low as 20 per cent in some 
cases), the authors report that the various approaches generate similar results with respect 
to the effect of over-education on earnings. Green and McIntosh (2002) use a somewhat 
broader definition of overskilling than the one adopted here, and report a level of 
 8
correlation between over-education and overskilling that is somewhat higher, with around 
50 per cent of all overeducated British workers reported to be also over-skilled. 
 
We assess the strength of the over-education / overskilling relationship using the HILDA 
data only. The WERS data was considered to be unsuitable for such an analysis due to 
difficulties associated with deriving over-education measures2. We adopt 3 over-
education measures; all are variations of the empirical method and are estimated at the 2 
digit level. The over-education definitions employed are as follows:  
 
Definition 1: One education level above the modal level of educational attainment within 
the occupation. 
 
Definition 2: One standard deviation above the mean level of educational attainment 
within the occupation. 
 
Definition 3: Half a standard deviation above the mean level of educational attainment 
within the occupation. 
 
The estimated incidences of over-education were 20 per cent under definition 1, 5 per 
cent under definition 2 and 17 per cent under definition 3. The very low estimate 
associated with definition 2 is because education attainment is a ranked variable that 
takes a value between 1 and 6 and, as such, there is limited variation in the data. 
Definitions one and three generate similar estimates and, due to the nature of the data, we 
can consider definition 2 to represent the least reliable estimate. Consistent with Green 
and McIntosh (2002), approximately 50 percent of those individuals identified as over-
educated were also found to be over-skilled, with approximately 20 per cent of the over-
                                                 
2 For instance, within a number of occupations the modal education level was the category Other, which 
cannot reasonably be used as an education benchmark as it does not relate to any particular level of 
attainment.  
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educated classed as severely over-skilled and the remaining 30 percent as moderately 
over-skilled (Table 1). The rates do not vary with the over-education definition 
employed. 
 
Table 1: Percentage of over-skilled workers by definition of over-education 
Alternative definitions of over-education 
Extent of overskilling 
Definition 1: 
Overeducated 
relative to majority 
in occupation 
Definition 2: 
Overeducated 
relative to 
occupational mean + 
1 stand. dev. 
Definition 3: 
Overeducated 
relative to 
occupational mean + 
½ stand. dev. 
Severely Over-skilled 18.62 22.48 18.86 
Moderately Over-skilled 29.39 29.46 28.86 
Well Matched 52.00 48.06 52.29 
Total  100.00 100.00 100.00 
Source: HILDA waves 1 to 4 (2001-2004). 
 
Given that the estimated rate of mismatch under the overskilling approach is at least 
twice that of over-education using methods 1 and 3, the proportions of over-skilled 
workers who are also over-educated are much lower (see Table 2). The greatest level of 
consistency was again with definitions 1 and 3 where between 21 and 25 percent of 
severely over-skilled and between 16 and 20 per cent of moderately over-skilled workers 
have been identified as over-educated. Unsurprisingly, the proportion of over-skilled 
workers identified as over-educated under definition 3 was extremely low. 
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Table 2: Proportion of overeducated workers by extent of overskilling 
Extent of Overskilling 
Alternative definitions of over-education Severely 
Over-skilled 
Moderately 
Over-skilled 
Overeducated relative to the occupational mode 24.70 19.17 
Overeducated relative to occupational mean + 1 
stand. dev. 8.96 5.85 
Overeducated relative to occupational mean + ½ 
stand. dev. 21.11 15.88 
Source: HILDA waves 1 to 4 (2001-2004). 
 
Nevertheless, the variation in the rates of over-skilled workers who are also overeducated 
enables us to gain some further insights into the relationship between the two variables. It 
has recently been argued, as noted in the Introduction, that the inclusion of an over-
education variable in a wage equation containing an overskilling variable constitutes an 
effective test of the job assignment theory. Allen et al. (2006) argue that the assignment 
theory can be rejected on the grounds that the overeducation coefficients remain 
unchanged when the wage equation is adjusted to include controls for overskilling. This 
seems a somewhat extreme interpretation given that the low impact on the overskilling 
variable could well be due to the low rate of correlation between the two variables.  The 
point is illustrated in Table 3, which presents the results of estimations which contain 
overskilling alone (Model 1), over-education alone (Model 2) and both overskilling and 
over-education (Model 3).3 As expected, the impact on the overskilling variables is 
greatest under over-education definitions 1 and 3 which were more heavily correlated 
with overskilling, whereas the impact of the much more weakly related definition 2 was 
negligible. The results suggest that the magnitude of adjustment on the coefficients will 
simply reflect the level of correlation between the overskilling and over-education 
                                                 
3 All previous covariates were also included but are omitted from the table for convenience purposes.  
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measure and, therefore, it is potentially misleading to place a heavy emphasis upon the 
outcomes of such simulations. 
 
Table 3: The effects of overskilling and over-education on wages - comparison of 
alternative over-education definitions 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Overeducation definition 1: 
(overeducated relative to the 
occupational mode) 
   
Severely overskilled  -0.082*** (0.015) 
-0.065*** 
(0.015) 
Moderately overskilled  -0.023** (0.010) 
-0.015 
(0.010) 
Overeducated  -0.147*** (0.013) 
 -0.141*** 
(0.013) 
Overeducation definition 2: 
(overeducated relative to 
occupational mean + 1 stand. dev.) 
  
 
Severely overskilled  -0.082*** (0.015) 
-0.077*** 
(0.015) 
Moderately overskilled  -0.023** (0.010) 
-0.028*** 
(0.010) 
Overeducated  -0.153*** (0.023) 
 -0.015*** 
(0.023) 
Overeducation definition 3: 
(overeducated relative to 
occupational mean + ½ stand. 
Dev.) 
  
 
Severely overskilled  -0.082*** (0.015) 
-0.065*** 
(0.015) 
Moderately overskilled  -0.023** (0.010) 
-0.016* 
(0.010) 
Overeducated  -0.159*** (0.014) 
 -0.152*** 
(0.014) 
Note: Dependent variable is weekly wages. Standard errors in brackets. HILDA survey waves 4 and 5. 
***/**/* denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 
In conclusion, the two variables of overskilling and overeducation appear to be different 
in the information they contain. The overskilling variable is likely to be more attractive to 
use for estimation purposes as it links the level of the employee skills with current job 
needs more directly than the overeducation variable which looks only at formal 
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qualifications. A crucial empirical observation in this context is that the coefficients of 
the overskilling variable in a wage equation are robust to the inclusion of the 
overeducation variable in the estimation. 
 
4. PATTERNS OF OVERSKILLING IN AUSTRALIA AND BRITAIN 
We focus on full-time employees only, using weekly earnings4 and correcting for usual 
hours worked. Regressions are run for all workers, men and women separately, and by 
highest education level (six categories). The education level equivalences have been set 
as follows: (i) below year 10 in Australia, corresponds to no qualifications in Britain; (ii) 
year 10 in Australia, corresponds to GCSEs or equivalent in Britain; (iii) year 11 to 12 in 
Australia, corresponds to A-levels or equivalent in Britain; (iv) Australian certificates and 
diplomas, corresponds to other academic or vocational qualifications in Britain; (v) first 
degrees or equivalent; and finally (vi) higher degree or equivalent. The variables 
included are the closest match that could be obtained in terms of the available questions 
in each data set. This required us to drop some variables that were significant in extended 
models in each country, but results on overskilling are robust to changes in the 
explanatory variables in each country and the coefficients and significance of the 
remaining explanatory variables are not affected in a discernible way. 
 
The results presented in Tables 4a and 4b suggest that overskilling is more prevalent in 
Britain than in Australia and is distributed differently. In Australia, severe overskilling 
declines from over 18 percent for those completing education below year 10 to less than 
                                                 
4 The WERS earnings data are grouped into 12 categories. For this reason, the data are analysed by interval 
regression for Britain and OLS for Australia where the earnings data are continuous. 
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10 percent for undergraduates, averaging 14 percent, while in Britain it is invariant to 
highest education level at around 18-21 percent. 
 
 Thus, Britain’s overskilling problem is more severe in two respects – it is more extensive 
overall and it is distributed proportionately more at the higher skill end of the labour 
market. 
 
Table 4a: Overskilling by education (Australia) 
Extent of Overskilling (%) 
Highest Education Level Well 
Matched 
Moderately 
Over-skilled 
Severely 
Over-skilled 
% 
Below Year 10 55.01 26.70 18.30 4.0
Year 10 51.71 33.04 15.25 10.8
Year 11-12 52.70 33.60 13.70 20.6
Certificates and diplomas 58.77 30.89 10.34 37.6
Undergraduate 61.91 28.25 9.85 24.7
Postgraduate 55.01 26.70 18.30 2.2
Total 52.36 33.41 14.23 100.00
Note: Sample size is 7,816. Source: HILDA. 
 
Table 4b: Overskilling by education (Britain) 
Extent of Overskilling (%) 
Highest Education Level Well 
Matched 
Moderately 
Over-skilled 
Severely 
Over-skilled 
% 
No qualifications 53.64 26.75 19.61 9.8
GCSEs or equivalent 47.55 33.63 18.82 11.0
A-levels or equivalent 44.18 37.53 18.29 5.9
Other academic or vocational 44.47 33.55 21.98 40.8
First degree or equivalent 44.43 34.65 20.92 24.1
Higher degree or equivalent 45.55 33.22 21.23 8.2
All qualifications 45.78 33.36 20.86 100.00
Note: Sample size is 14,237. Source: WERS 2004. 
 
The question that arises is to what extent overskilling is a function of occupation and 
industry. Occupation and industry matter because we need to identify where employers 
need to focus more on the way in which they utilise skills available to them. Using two 
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countries is helpful as there may be basic reasons for the distribution of overskilling. If 
the distributions are different in Britain and Australia, this suggests that they are not 
immutable. The degree of mismatch is higher in higher occupations in Britain than in 
Australia. Tables 5a and 5b present all occupations in Australia and Britain, and Tables 
6a and 6b all industries. 
 
Table 5a: Overskilling by occupation (Australia) 
Extent of Overskilling (%) 
Occupation Well 
Matched 
Moderately 
Over-skilled 
Severely 
Over-skilled 
Managers &administrators 70.54 24.65 4.82
Professionals 71.86 22.83 5.31
Associate professionals 61.48 29.96 8.57
Tradespersons & related 63.7 29.19 7.11
Advanced clerical& services 
workers 52.93 33.54 13.54
Intermediate clerical, sales & 
services workers 49.23 34.82 15.94
Intermediate production & 
transport workers 44.49 33.37 22.14
Elementary clerical, sales & 
services workers 33.74 34.74 31.51
Labourers & related workers 36.42 32.64 30.95
All occupations 56.51 29.64 13.84
Note: Selected occupations. Full time employees only. Source: HILDA. 
 
Considering first occupations in Tables 5a and 5b, the distribution of overskilling over 
the two countries is consistent in so far as its incidence is inversely related to 
occupational level, but the extent to which incidence changes with respect to 
occupational distribution is very different. In Australia less than five percent of managers 
and administrators are severely over-skilled, while the comparable figure for Britain is 16 
percent.  
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Table 5b: Overskilling by occupation (Britain) 
Extent of Overskilling (%) 
Occupation Well 
Matched 
Moderately 
Over-skilled 
Severely 
Over-skilled 
Managers & senior officials 47.97 36.11 15.92
Professional 52.93 33.01 14.07
Associate professional & 
technical 47.88 34.21 17.91
Administrative & secretarial 44.19 35.40 20.41
Skilled trades 42.75 33.30 23.95
Personal service 49.10 28.62 22.28
Sales & customer service 39.38 35.35 25.27
Process, plant & machine 
operatives 40.63 31.10 28.28
Elementary 38.62 29.14 32.24
All occupations 45.74 33.46 20.81
Note: Selected occupations. Full time employees only. Source: WERS 2004. 
 
For elementary occupations, the figures are very close at 31 and 32 percent respectively. 
Turning to the industrial distribution of overskilling in Tables 6a and 6b, the variation is 
much greater in Australia, ranging from just over seven percent in Government 
Administration to 25 percent in the Retail Trade and Accommodation, Restaurants and 
Cafes. In Britain, the range is from 17 percent in Education to over 27 percent in 
Transport and Communications. It is noteworthy that overskilling appears to be less 
marked in the Public Sector, especially in Australia where the severe overskilling 
proportions for Government Administration, Education, and Health and Community 
Services are 7.31, 5.23 and 8.4 percent respectively. The Private Sector incidence varies 
across the two countries. 
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Table 6a: Overskilling by Industry (Australia) 
Extent of Overskilling (%) Industry 
Well 
Matched 
Moderately 
Over-skilled 
Severely 
Over-skilled 
Agriculture, forestry 60.28 28.23 11.49 
Mining 58.06 30.65 11.29 
Manufacturing 51.84 32.41 15.75 
Electricity, gas & water 55.26 33.33 11.4 
Construction 61.75 30.13 8.12 
Wholesale trade 49.23 34.48 16.28 
Retail trade 42.12 33.13 24.74 
Accommodation, restaurant & cafes 40.91 34.24 24.85 
Transport & storage 50.82 34.55 14.63 
Communication services 45.08 37.5 17.42 
Finance & insurance 62.55 26.69 10.76 
Property & business services 58.38 28.47 13.14 
Government administration 58.64 34.04 7.31 
Education 72.91 21.85 5.23 
Health & community services  65.59 26.01 8.4 
Cultural & recreational services  58.44 27.71 13.85 
Personal & other services  61.92 25.51 12.57 
All industries 56.51 29.64 13.84 
Note: Full time employees only. Source: HILDA (2004-5). 
 
Table 6b Overskilling by Industry (Britain) 
Extent of Overskilling (%) Industry 
Well 
Matched 
Moderately 
Over-skilled 
Severely 
Over-skilled 
Manufacturing 42.72 33.42 23.86 
Electricity, gas & water supply 42.95 38.24 18.81 
Construction 49.31 32.50 18.19 
Wholesale & retail 44.72 31.74 23.53 
Hotels & restaurants 44.05 30.56 25.40 
Transport & communication 39.61 32.90 27.49 
Financial services 45.16 36.42 18.42 
Other business services 48.53 33.21 18.27 
Public administration 44.41 35.84 19.75 
Education 49.40 33.48 17.12 
Health 51.51 30.90 17.59 
Other community services 41.01 33.82 25.17 
All industries 45.78 33.36 20.86 
Note: Full time employees only. Source: WERS 2004. 
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5. ESTIMATION RESULTS 
We estimate a standard wage regression in which the log of weekly wages is regressed on 
a vector of characteristics for individual i in workplace j: 
iiijiji MOSSOSZXW εαααα ++++= 4321ln  [1] 
where iX  includes a vector of demographic variables such as gender, marital status, age, 
tenure and educational attainment (full details available in Appendix), Zj includes a 
vector of employment characteristics such as size of firm and industry, SOS is a dummy 
for severe overskilling and MOS a dummy for moderate overskilling (with well matched 
being the reference category), α denotes the estimated returns to the characteristic vectors 
and iε  is a standard iid error term. 
 
In Table 7 we assess the effects of overskilling on earnings for all full-time employees in 
the two countries. In each case earnings are significantly lower for the over-skilled: by 
8.2 percent for the severely over-skilled in Australia and by 12.0 percent in Britain. For 
the moderately over-skilled, the corresponding figures are 2.5 and 2.9 percent 
respectively. Thus, Britain suffers not only from more extensive overskilling than 
Australia, but also from a greater negative impact on earnings. Women earn 12 percent 
less than men in Australia and 14% less than men in Britain. The mark-up to obtaining a 
degree compared to no qualification is 42% in Australia and 56% in Britain, with 
corresponding figures for postgraduates being 51% in Australia and 68% in Britain 
respectively. Those who are not married earn 6.8 and 5.7% less than those who are 
married. Age-earnings profiles follow the expected inverted U-shaped pattern and 
earnings also increase with tenure.  
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Table 7: OLS and interval regression estimates for effects of overskilling on weekly 
wages - Australia vs. Britain  
Weekly Wages Explanatory variable Australia Britain 
Severely over-skilled -0.082*** (0.015) -0.120*** (0.008) 
Moderately over-skilled -0.025** (0.010) -0.029*** (0.007) 
Female -0.120*** (0.010) -0.142*** (0.007) 
Educational attainment – Year 10  0.088*** (0.024) 0.191*** (0.013) 
Educational attainment – Year 11 to 12 0.163*** (0.023) 0.301*** (0.016) 
Educational attainment – Certificate / diploma 0.192*** (0.022) 0.273*** (0.011) 
Educational attainment – Undergraduate 0.417*** (0.023) 0.555*** (0.012) 
Educational attainment – Postgraduate 0.512*** (0.030) 0.675*** (0.015) 
Not married (or de facto)   -0.068*** (0.010) -0.056*** (0.007) 
Employment tenure- 1-<2 years -0.061*** (0.016) 0.030*** (0.011) 
Employment tenure- 2-5 years -0.042*** (0.012) 0.064*** (0.010) 
Employment tenure- 5-10 years (dropped) 0.047*** (0.011) 
Employment tenure- >10 years 0.034*** (0.012) 0.109*** (0.011) 
Hours usually worked in main job (weekly) 0.014*** (0.001) 0.014*** (0.0005) 
Age – 18 to  19 years  0.163** (0.073) 0.042 (0.047) 
Age – 20 to  21 years 0.351*** (0.070) 0.183*** (0.045) 
Age – 22 to  29 years 0.496*** (0.067) 0.331*** (0.042) 
Age – 30 to  39 years 0.565*** (0.067) 0.470*** (0.042) 
Age – 40 to  49 years 0.606*** (0.067) 0.516*** (0.042) 
Age – 50 to  59 years 0.639*** (0.067) 0.533*** (0.042) 
Age – 60 to  64 years 0.604*** (0.072) 0.460*** (0.046) 
Has supervisory role  0.084*** (0.009) 0.223 (0.007) 
A Union Member  0.054*** (0.010) 0.008 (0.007) 
Have children aged between 5 and 14 0.020* (0.011) 0.007d (0.007) 
Have children aged below 5  0.038** (0.015) 0.044*** (0.010) 
Employed on fixed term  0.014 (0.016) -0.019 (0.018)  
Casual worker -0.045** (0.022) -0.075*** (0.021) 
Differences in the models    
Coloured (UK)  -0.063***(0.013) 
Migrant from English speaking country (Aus) 0.028* (0.014) 
Migrant from non-English speaking country (Aus) -0.048*** (0.013)   
Firm that employs less than 5 people -0.208*** (0.018)  
Firm that employs between 5-9 people -0.143*** (0.016) -0.131*** (0.018) 
Firm that employs between 10-19 people -0.113*** (0.014) -0.096***e (0.011) 
Firm that employs between 20-49 people  -0.061*** (0.012) -0.035***f (0.008) 
Constant  5.477*** (0.075) 4.526*** (0.048) 
N  5843 14237 
Prob > F   0.0000 0.0000 
R square 0.4852 NA 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Reference groups are as follows: age 16-17; education attainment 
below yr 10; employed with current employer for less than a year; employed on continuing contract with a 
firm that employs at least 50 people. ***/**/* denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
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Supervisory status has a much stronger effect in Britain, while trade union membership, 
which is significant in Australia, is insignificant in Britain.5 A number of other variables 
such as employer size, children and temporary contracts have a similar effect in each 
country and are shown in detail in Table A7 in the Appendix. The overall conclusion 
from Table 7 is that, so far as wages and skills go, the main manifestation of mis-matches 
in the labour market is amongst those who perceive themselves as severely over-skilled. 
 
Despite the inclusion of a large number of human capital variables as well as variables 
that relate to the employers, the wage penalty due to severe overskilling remains at 8 
percent in Australia and 12 percent in Britain. This means that severe overskilling is 
associated with labour market mis-matches. Considering that the wage penalty will only 
be one part of the loss generated by a mis-match (the other part will be lost output and 
profit for the employer), the estimated wage penalties presented in this paper can be 
thought of as a fraction of the total productivity losses resulting from severe overskilling. 
Reported moderate overskilling yields different results with a lesser empirical presence. 
Although the estimated wage penalties are significant for both Australia and Britain, their 
sizes are only 2.5 and 2.9 percent respectively. Nevertheless, given the large number of 
individuals that report moderate overskilling, the estimated small per person wage 
penalty (and the implied productivity loss) could add up to sizeable economy-wide 
losses.  
                                                 
5 In the case of the WERS data we experimented by including a training variable with varying lengths of 
training included relative to the baseline of no training. The data questions we used relate to recent training 
in the last twelve months and so they do not capture all training received in the past. Training of one day or 
more significantly increased earnings, but only marginally reduced the negative effect of overskilling on 
earnings from 12 percent to 11.3 percent for those severely over-skilled and from 3 percent to 2.8 percent 
for those moderately over-skilled. 
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 Next we consider separately how the wage penalty differs amongst the different 
categories of educational qualifications in Table 8. We have defined six categories and 
we present them all. 
Table 8: Effects of overskilling on weekly earnings by education level 6  
Weekly Wages Explanatory variable 
Australia Britain Australia Britain 
Education level comparison Below yr. 10/No qualifications Year 10/ GCSE
Severely over-skilled 0.030 
(0.092) 
-0.028 
(0.023) 
-0.113*** 
(0.036) 
-0.050** 
(0.024) 
Moderately over-skilled 0.019 
(0.071) 
-0.001 
(0.021) 
-0.070*** 
(0.026) 
-0.028 
(0.020) 
Female (=1, Male = 0) -0.094 
(0.077) 
-0.213*** 
(0.022) 
-0.084*** 
(0.026) 
-0.147*** 
(0.020) 
Sample size 217 1402 625 1573 
Prob > F 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
R square 0.4293 1 0.5417 1
Education level comparison Year 11-12/ A-level Certificates
Severely over-skilled -0.094*** 
(0.029) 
-0.133*** 
(0.035) 
-0.044* 
(0.026) 
-0.094*** 
(0.012) 
Moderately over-skilled 0.008 
(0.021) 
0.001 
(0.028) 
-0.040** 
(0.016) 
-0.012 
(0.010) 
Female (=1, Male = 0) -0.159*** 
(0.021) 
-0.135*** 
(0.027) 
-0.095*** 
(0.019) 
-0.150*** 
(0.011) 
N  1123 842 2075 5815 
Prob > F   0.0000 0.0000   0.0000   0.0000 
R square 0.4866  0.4227  
Education level comparison Undergraduates Postgraduates
Severely over-skilled -0.159*** 
(0.034) 
-0.203*** 
(0.016) 
-0.157 
(0.124) 
-0.183*** 
(0.028) 
Moderately over-skilled -0.003 
(0.020) 
-0.058*** 
(0.014) 
-0.077 
(0.054) 
-0.096*** 
(0.025) 
Female (=1, Male = 0) -0.115*** 
(0.019) 
-0.102*** 
(0.013) 
-0.111** 
(0.050) 
-0.141*** 
(0.023) 
N  1490 3437 308 1168 
Prob > F   0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
R square 0.4227  0.3722  
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. OLS regression results for Australia and Interval Regression results 
for Britain, with weekly wage as the dependent variable. A large number of covariates has been included 
and is reported in Appendix Tables A5a, A5b and A5c. ***/**/* denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% 
respectively 
 
                                                 
6 Although the education systems in the two countries are very similar, there are some small differences. In 
Britain, the minimum school leaving age is sixteen, while in Australia in all states and territories other than 
Tasmania, education is compulsory for children between the age of six and fifteen. In Tasmania, 
meanwhile, education is compulsory between six and sixteen. Freebairn (2007) reports that a third of 
students in Australia did not complete secondary school and for those who did not complete year 12, only 
half of those of workforce age were employed. 
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There do not appear to be any wage penalties for both severe and moderate overskilling 
in both Australia and Britain for the lowest education category. These are the people with 
the largest proportion of reported overskilling, but they do not appear to be penalised for 
their overskilling after their own and their employers’ characteristics have been 
controlled for. One possible explanation is that their pay is very close to a lower bound 
defined by the minimum wage legislation that both countries have in place. This simply 
precludes the presence of any wage penalty. With the year 10/GCSE category, a 
considerable wage penalty appears in Australia for both severe (11.3%) and moderate 
(7%) overskilling and a modest wage penalty only for severe overskilling (5%) in Britain. 
The implication is that there are severe mis-matches in this education category in 
Australia, but not so much in Britain.  
 
Moving to categories with higher educational attainment, most of the wage penalty 
estimates for moderate overskilling disappear, with only a modest 4 percent penalty for 
those in possession of certificates and diplomas in Australia and a 5.8 and 9.6 percent 
penalty for those with graduate and postgraduate qualifications respectively in Britain. 
All remaining action is concentrated on the severe overskilling wage penalties, which 
increase as education levels rise. In all (comparable) education categories from year 11 
and higher, the wage penalty for overskilling is higher in Britain than in Australia. The 
highest wage penalty for severe overskilling in Britain appears to be amongst those who 
completed an undergraduate degree (at 20.3%) followed closely by those with a 
postgraduate degree (at 18.3%). Similarly, the highest wage penalty for severe 
overskilling in Australia is amongst those who completed an undergraduate degree (at 
 22
15.9%), almost equal to that for postgraduate degree holders (at 15.7%), although it 
should be noted that this last estimate is not very precise. It is noteworthy that the 
overskilling wage penalty for those with vocational qualifications (certificates) is 
considerably lower than all categories with education from year 11 and higher in both 
countries.  
 
To the extent that these different levels of education may generate a different mix of 
general and specific human capital (broadly speaking, the category ‘Year 11-12/A-level’ 
has a higher ratio of general/specific human capital than the category ‘Certificates’), this 
may be an important finding. Another important observation that arises from Table 8 is 
that the wage effects of overskilling and any associated mis-match generated productivity 
losses are present in a much larger proportion of the labour market than the over-
education literature suggests, where the analysis is limited to University graduates or 
similar. In Table 8, conditional estimates and sample sizes show that in Australia a 
penalty of around 10 percent and more applies to 61 percent of the Australian labour 
force and 79 percent of the British labour force.  
 
Table 9 looks briefly at the gender dimension of the overskilling issue, with detailed 
results given in Table A9 in the Appendix. In Australia, the wage penalty is greater for 
severely over-skilled males relative to severely over-skilled females (9.5% compared to 
5.7%). There is no significant penalty for moderately over-skilled Australian males, 
whereas for females there is a significant negative effect on wages of 3.8%. In Britain, 
the effects are generally stronger with a wage penalty of 12.4% for severely over-skilled 
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males, 11.4% for severely over-skilled females, 2.4% for moderately over-skilled males 
and 4.0% for moderately over-skilled females. Gender differences in the overskilling 
penalty are only present in Australia and for the severely over-skilled. Looking at the 
results as a whole, males are more damaged than females by being severely over-skilled 
in both countries and females are more damaged than males for being moderately over-
skilled in both countries. 
 
Table 9: Effects of overskilling on weekly earnings by gender (for full-time working age) 
Males Females Explanatory variable 
Australia  UK Australia  UK  
Severely over-skilled -0.095*** 
(0.019) 
-0.124*** 
(0.010) 
-0.057*** 
(0.022) 
-0.114*** 
(0.012) 
Moderately over-skilled -0.015 
(0.013) 
-0.024** 
(0.009) 
-0.038*** 
(0.014) 
-0.040*** 
(0.010) 
Sample size 3653 8107 2185 6130 
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
R square 0.4741 - 0.4989 - 
Note: ***/**/* denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 
5. JOB DISCRETION AND OVERSKILLING 
It has been argued in the over-education literature that over-educated workers may be 
able to change the nature of their job in such a way as to minimise the effects of a mis-
match. The degree to which they may be able to do this will depend on the extent to 
which they have job discretion. The WERS data set, but not the HILDA survey, contains 
questions relating to job discretion in the employee questionnaire. Employees are asked 
“overall, how satisfied are you with the amount of involvement you have in decision-
making at this workplace?”. They are also asked how satisfied they are with the 
following aspects of their job: (i) the scope for using their own initiative and (ii) the 
amount of influence they have over their job. In each case there are five possible 
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responses, ranging from very satisfied to very dissatisfied. We enter these into our 
earnings regressions as a series of dummies with the category “very dissatisfied” being 
the excluded (reference) category in all cases. We hypothesise that where workers are 
able to influence the way in which they work, this should raise their productivity and thus 
reduce their negative effect of overskilling on wages. We present the results from these 
regressions in the following Table 10. 
 
Table 10: The relationship between various forms of job discretion and the wage 
effect of overskilling 
 Model 1 Model 2 % reduction 
Severely over-skilled -0.118*** -0.104*** 12.6 
Moderately over-skilled -0.029*** -0.025*** 13.8 
Involvement in decision-
making 
   
1 (Very satisfied)  0.178***  
2  0.108***  
3  0.053***  
4  0.045***  
Severely over-skilled -0.118*** -0.109*** 7.6 
Moderately over-skilled -0.030*** -0.027*** 6.9 
Scope for initiative    
1 (Very satisfied)  0.133***  
2  0.086***  
3  0.047***  
4  0.047***  
Severely over-skilled -0.118*** -0.110*** 7.6 
Moderately over-skilled -0.030*** -0.030*** 0.0 
Influence on the job    
1 (Very satisfied)  0.172***  
2  0.113***  
3  0.075***  
4  0.076***  
Severely over-skilled -0.118*** -0.101*** 14.4 
Moderately over-skilled -0.030*** -0.026*** 13.3 
Combined discretion variables    
Note: In all job discretion variables the reference category is “very dissatisfied”. *** imply significance at 
the 1 percent level. The same specification has been used as in all other regressions. Source: WERS 2004. 
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Table 10 estimates the same wage regression with (Model 2) and without (Model 1) the 
discretion variables in the right hand side. All three discretion variables produce very 
similar results. First, discretion and wages are positively associated. Second, the 
relationship is particularly strong where discretion is at its highest. Third, the association 
is statistically significant at all levels of discretion. The variable “involvement in 
decision-making” appears to be the one with the strongest association with wages, as it is 
probably the one with the clearest definition in the workplace. It has to be noted that this 
can be a variable with considerable endogeneity in the context of wage regressions, as 
discretion may generate higher wages and higher wages may simply be the result of well-
used past discretion. The data at hand does not allow us to test this, but what is evident in 
the present context is that when each of the discretion variables are present in the 
estimation the overskilling coefficients are lower. The largest reduction in the 
overskilling coefficient occurs when all discretion variables are introduced together: the 
negative effect of severe overskilling on wage drops by 14 percent and that of moderate 
overskilling drops by 13 percent. It should be noted that, although the relationship 
between job discretion and the wage penalty caused by overskilling is weak, it is very 
precisely estimated. 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
The phenomenon of overskilling is present in both Australia and Britain, but more so in 
the latter and particularly so for those with degree qualifications. There are also wage 
penalties associated with overskilling in both countries, with the effects being stronger in 
Britain. For the severely over-skilled, the wage penalties are larger for men than for 
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women, while this pattern (albeit with lower estimates) is reversed for the moderately 
over-skilled. When the data are split by highest educational qualifications, the wage 
penalties are seen to be greater for degree holders, but the prevalence of overskilling is 
higher for the lower education levels. Overskilling is found to be less prevalent amongst 
graduates, but is also found to carry the highest wage penalty amongst graduates. Thus, in 
general, the problem of overskilling is greater in the case of graduates and particularly so 
in Britain. 
 
In this paper we have argued that overskilling is a more appropriate measure of labour 
market mis-match than over-education, because workers’ responses to the overskilling 
question should incorporate differences in abilities and differences with regards to the 
real demands of jobs. Although abilities and job demands are anything between 
unobservable to only imperfectly observed, the overskilling response provides a unique 
insight in this direction. We find some evidence that increased job discretion is associated 
with lower penalties for overskilling which, though small in magnitude, illustrates the 
fact that employers can moderate the effects of mis-matches by responding positively to 
the perceptions of the workforce and involving them more in decisions about how work is 
carried out. 
 
Overskilling may occur because some workers choose less onerous jobs, but whether or 
not this is the case, it always represents a financial loss to the employee which ultimately 
may lead to unintended losses in job satisfaction and productivity with associated losses 
to the employer also. Overskilling has the potential also to lower returns to the state 
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insofar as lower earnings result in lower contributions towards the repayment of income 
contingent loans. 
 28
REFERENCES 
Allen J. and van der Velden, R., Educational Mismatches versus Skill Mismatches: 
Effects on Wage, Job Satisfaction and On-the-Job Search, Oxford Economic 
Papers, 53(3), 2001, pp 434-452. 
 
Allen, J., Badillo-Amador, L., and van der Velden, R., Wage Effects of Job-Worker 
Mismatches; Heterogeneous Skills or Institutional Effects, Maastricht University, 
September 2006, Unpublished manuscript. 
 
Battu, H., Belfield C. and Sloane P. How well can we measure graduate over-education 
and its effects? National Institute Economic Review, vol. 171. January 2000, pp. 82-
93. 
 
Chapman, P. and Ryan C., The Access Implications of Income Contingent Charges for 
Higher Education: Lessons from Australia, Australian National University, Centre 
for Economic Policy Research, Discussion Paper No. 463, April, 2003. 
 
Di Prieto, G. and Urwin, P., Education and Skill Mismatches in the Italian Graduate 
Labour Market, Applied Economics, 38(1), 2006, pp 79-93. 
 
Elias, P. and Purcell, K., Measuring Change in the Graduate Labour Market, Research 
Paper No. 1, Warwick Institute for Employment Research, April 2003. 
 
Freebairn, J., Making the Boom Pay, Insights, Vol 1, April 2007, Melbourne Economics 
and Commerce, pp 15-20. 
 
Green, F. and McIntosh, S., Is there a Genuine Under-utilisation of Skills among the 
Overqualified? SKOPE Research Paper 50, 2002. 
 
O’Leary, N. and Sloane, P., The Return to a University Education in Great Britain, 
National Institute Economic Review, No. 193, July 2005, pp 75-89. 
 
Sattinger, M., Assignment Models of the Distribution of Earnings, Journal of Economic 
Literature, vol 31(2), pp 831-880. 
 
 
 29
APPENDIX 
Definition of variables 
 
Female: Dummy variable, takes the value 1 if female, zero otherwise (Australia and 
UK). 
Migrant (English speaking country): Dummy variable, takes the value 1 if migrant 
from an English speaking country, zero otherwise (Australia only). For Britain, there is a 
dummy variable that takes the value 1 if coloured and 0 otherwise, for which being a 
migrant from English speaking country would fall under.  
Migrant (non-English speaking country): Dummy variable, takes the value 1 if migrant 
from an non English speaking country, zero otherwise(Australia only). For Britain, there 
is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if coloured and 0 otherwise, for which being a 
migrant from non-English speaking country would fall under.  
Education – year 10: Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if highest qualification is 
year 10 (Australia) or GCSEs or equivalent (UK), zero otherwise.  
Education – year 11 to 12: Dummy variable, takes the value 1 if highest qualification is 
between years 11 and 12 (Australia) or A-levels or equivalent (UK), zero otherwise. 
Education – Certificate / Diploma: Dummy variable, takes the value 1 if highest 
qualification is a certificate or diploma (Australia) or Other academic or vocational (UK), 
zero otherwise. 
Education – Undergraduate: Dummy variable, takes the value 1 if highest qualification 
is university undergraduate degree (Australia) or First degree or equivalent (UK) , zero 
otherwise. 
Education – Postgraduate: Dummy variable, takes the value 1 if highest qualification is 
postgraduate degree (Australia) or Higher degree or equivalent (UK), zero otherwise. 
Hours usually worked in main job (weekly): Continuous variable (Australia and UK). 
Not married (or de facto): Dummy variable, takes the value 1 if individual is single, 
zero otherwise (Australia and UK). 
Age between 18 and 19 years: Dummy variable, takes the value 1 if individual aged 
between 18 and 19, zero otherwise (Australia and UK). 
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Age between 20 and 21 years: Dummy variable, takes the value 1 if individual aged 
between 20 and 21, zero otherwise (Australia and UK). 
Age between 22 and 29 years: Dummy variable, takes the value 1 if individual aged 
between 22 and 29, zero otherwise (Australia and UK). 
Age between 30 and 39 years: Dummy variable, takes the value 1 if individual aged 
between 30 and 39, zero otherwise (Australia and UK). 
Age between 40 and 49 years: Dummy variable, takes the value 1 if individual aged 
between 40 and 49, zero otherwise (Australia and UK). 
Age between 50 and 59 years: Dummy variable, takes the value 1 if individual aged 
between 50 and 59, zero otherwise (Australia and UK) 
Age between 60 and 64 years: Dummy variable, takes value 1 if individual aged 
between 60 and 64, zero otherwise (Australia and UK). 
Has supervisory role: Dummy variable, takes value 1 if individual has supervisory role, 
zero otherwise (Australia and UK). 
Union member: Dummy variable, takes the value 1 if individual is a member of a trade 
union, zero otherwise (Australia and UK). 
Have children aged between 5 and 14: Dummy variable, takes the value 1 if individual 
has children between the ages of 5 and 14, zero otherwise (Australia and UK). 
Have children aged under 5: Dummy variable, takes the value 1 if an individual has 
children aged under 5, zero otherwise (Australia and UK).  
Employment tenure- 1-<2 years: Dummy variable, takes the value 1 if individual is 
employed with current employer for at least one yr and less than 2 years, zero otherwise 
(Australia and UK). 
Employment tenure- 2-5 years: Dummy variable, takes the value 1 if individual is 
employed with current employer for between 2-5 years, zero otherwise (Australia and 
UK). 
Employment tenure- 5-10 years: Dummy variable, takes the value 1 if individual is 
employed with current employer for between 5-10 years, zero otherwise (Australia and 
UK). 
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Employment tenure- >10 years: Dummy variable, takes the value 1 if individual is 
employed with current employer for more than 10 years, zero otherwise (Australia and 
UK). 
Employed on fixed term: Dummy variable, takes the value 1 if individual is employed 
on fixed term contracts, zero otherwise (Australia and UK). 
Casual worker: Dummy variable, takes the value 1 if individual is employed on casual 
basis, zero otherwise (Australia and UK).  
Firm that employs less than 5 people: Dummy variable, takes the value 1 if the firm the 
individual is employed at employs less than 5 people, zero otherwise (Australia and UK).  
Firm that employs between 5-9 people:  Dummy variable, takes the value 1 if the firm 
the individual is employed at employs between 5 and 9 people, zero otherwise (Australia 
and UK).  
Firm that employs between 10-19 people:  Dummy variable, takes the value 1 if the 
firm the individual is employed at employs between 10 and 19 people (Australia) or 10 
and 24 people (UK), zero otherwise.  
Firm that employs between 20-49 people: Dummy variable, takes the value 1 if the 
firm the individual is employed at employs between 20 and 49 people (Australia) or 25 
and 49 people (UK), zero otherwise.  
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Full regression results 
 
Table A7: OLS and interval regression estimates for effects of overskilling on 
weekly wages: Australia vs. UK  
Weekly Wages Explanatory variable 
Australia UK 
Severely over-skilled -0.082*** (0.015) -0.120*** (0.008) 
Moderately over-skilled -0.025** (0.010) -0.029*** (0.007) 
Female -0.120*** (0.010) -0.142*** (0.007) 
Educational attainment – Year 10  0.088*** (0.024) 0.191***a (0.013) 
Educational attainment – Year 11 to 12 0.163*** (0.023) 0.301***b (0.016) 
Educational attainment – Certificate / diploma 0.192*** (0.022) 0.273***c (0.011) 
Educational attainment – Undergraduate 0.417*** (0.023) 0.555*** (0.012) 
Educational attainment – Postgraduate 0.512*** (0.030) 0.675*** (0.015) 
Not married (or de facto)   -0.068*** (0.010) -0.056*** (0.007) 
Employment tenure- 1-<2 years -0.061*** (0.016) 0.030*** (0.011) 
Employment tenure- 2-5 years -0.042*** (0.012) 0.064*** (0.010) 
Employment tenure- 5-10 years (dropped) 0.047*** (0.011) 
Employment tenure- >10 years 0.034*** (0.012) 0.109*** (0.011) 
Hours usually worked in main job (weekly) 0.014*** (0.001) 0.014*** (0.0005) 
Age – 18 to  19 years  0.163** (0.073) 0.042 (0.047) 
Age – 20 to  21 years 0.351*** (0.070) 0.183*** (0.045) 
Age – 22 to  29 years 0.496*** (0.067) 0.331*** (0.042) 
Age – 30 to  39 years 0.565*** (0.067) 0.470*** (0.042) 
Age – 40 to  49 years 0.606*** (0.067) 0.516*** (0.042) 
Age – 50 to  59 years 0.639*** (0.067) 0.533*** (0.042) 
Age – 60 to  64 years 0.604*** (0.072) 0.460*** (0.046) 
Has supervisory role  0.084*** (0.009) 0.223 (0.007) 
A Union Member  0.054*** (0.010) 0.008 (0.007) 
Have children aged between 5 and 14 0.020* (0.011) 0.007d (0.007) 
Have children aged below 5  0.038** (0.015) 0.044*** (0.010) 
Employed on fixed term  0.014 (0.016) -0.019 (0.018)  
Casual worker -0.045** (0.022) -0.075*** (0.021) 
Differences in models    
Coloured (UK only)  -0.063***(0.013) 
Migrant from English speaking country (Aus) 0.028* (0.014) 
Migrant from non-English speaking country 
(Aus) -0.048*** (0.013) 
 
 
 
Worked at a firm that employs less than 5 
people -0.208*** (0.018)  
Worked at a firm that employs between 5-9 
people -0.143*** (0.016) -0.131*** (0.018) 
Worked at a firm that employs between 10-19 
people -0.113*** (0.014) -0.096***e (0.011) 
Worked at a firm that employs between 20-49 
people  -0.061*** (0.012) -0.035***f (0.008) 
Industry- Agriculture, forestry and fishery -0.153*** (0.034)  
Industry- Mining  0.362*** (0.032)  
Industry- Electricity, gas and water  0.070* (0.040) 0.143 (0.021) 
Industry- Construction 0.135*** (0.021) 0.086 (0.014) 
Industry- Wholesale 0.011 (0.023) 
Industry- Retail -0.127*** (0.018) -0.111(0.013) 
Industry- Accommodation, Cafes and 
Restaurants -0.121*** (0.028) -0.357 (0.023) 
Industry- Transport 0.076*** (0.022) 0.021 (0.013) 
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Industry- Communication 0.064** (0.027)  
Industry- Finance 0.219*** (0.023) 0.207 (0.014) 
Industry- Property& Business Services (/other 
Business Services) 0.112*** (0.018) 0.151 (0.011) 
Industry- Defence 0.074*** (0.019) 0.082g (0.012) 
Industry- Education  -0.089*** (0.019) -0.009 (0.013) 
Industry- Health  -0.088*** (0.018) -0.042 (0.012) 
Industry- Cultural & recreational Services -0.045 (0.031) -0.047h  (0.015) 
Industry- Personal & other services  -0.050** (0.024)  
Constant  5.477*** (0.075) 4.526*** (0.048) 
N  5843 14237 
Prob > F   0.0000 0.0000 
R square 0.4852  
Notes:  ***/**/* denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
 
a For UK, the equivalent variable is “Educational attainment – GCSEs or equivalent” 
b For UK, the equivalent variable is “Educational attainment – A-levels or equivalent” 
c For UK, the equivalent variable is “Educational attainment – Other academic or vocational” 
d For UK, the variable is “Have children aged between 5 and 18” 
e For UK, the variable is “Worked at a firm that employs between 10-24 people”  
f For UK, the variable is “Worked at a firm that employs between 25-49 people”  
g For UK, the variable is “Industry- Public Administration”  
h For UK, the variable is “Industry- other Community Services” 
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Table A8a: Effects of overskilling on weekly earnings by education level 
Weekly Wages 
Below yr. 10/No qualifications Year 10/ GCSE 
Explanatory variable 
Australia UK Australia UK 
Severely over-skilled 0.030 
(0.092) 
-0.028 
(0.023) 
-0.113*** 
(0.036) 
-0.050** 
(0.024) 
Moderately over-skilled 0.019 
(0.071) 
-0.001 
(0.021) 
-0.070*** 
(0.026) 
-0.028 
(0.020) 
Female -0.094 
(0.077) 
-0.213*** 
(0.022) 
-0.084*** 
(0.026) 
-0.147*** 
(0.020) 
Not married (or de facto)   -0.017 
(0.072)
-0.058*** 
(0.020)
-0.079*** 
(0.027) 
-0.056*** 
(0.020)
Employment tenure- 1-<2 years 
(dropped) 
-0.008 
(0.040) 
0.024 
(0.044) 
0.011 
(0.034) 
Employment tenure- 2-<5 years -0.098 
(0.124) 
0.034 
(0.033) 
-0.027 
(0.031) 
0.067** 
(0.028) 
Employment tenure- 5-10 years -0.028 
(0.122) 
0.031 
(0.034) (dropped) 
0.069** 
(0.031) 
Employment tenure- >10 years -0.011 
(0.121) 
0.113*** 
(0.033) 
0.049 
(0.033) 
0.115*** 
(0.032) 
Hours usually worked in main job 
(weekly) 
0.015*** 
(0.003) 
0.011*** 
(0.001) 
0.014*** 
(0.002) 
0.012*** 
(0.001) 
Age – 18 to  19 years  
0.754*** 
(0.286) 
-0.167 
(0.188) 
-0.106 
(0.109) 
0.239*** 
(0.077) 
Age – 20 to  21 years 
0.990** 
(0.421) 
-0.074 
(0.195) 
0.185 
(0.120) 
0.402*** 
(0.077) 
Age – 22 to  29 years 
0.786*** 
(0.294) 
0.132 
(0.170) 
0.263** 
(0.101) 
0.524*** 
(0.070) 
Age – 30 to  39 years 
1.077*** 
(0.268) 
0.113 
(0.165) 
0.336*** 
(0.096) 
0.587*** 
(0.069) 
Age – 40 to  49 years 
1.030*** 
0.260) 
0.162 
(0.164) 
0.360*** 
(0.095) 
0.672*** 
(0.069) 
Age – 50 to  59 years 
1.106*** 
(0.257) 
0.177 
(0.164) 
0.409*** 
(0.096) 
0.700*** 
(0.072) 
Age – 60 to  64 years 
1.055*** 
(0.272) 
0.110 
(0.167) 
0.397*** 
(0.110) 
0.705*** 
(0.118) 
Has supervisory role  
-0.070 
(0.065) 
0. 200*** 
(0.021) 
0.057** 
(0.024) 
0.168*** 
(0.020) 
A Union Member  0.246*** 
(0.068) 
0.026 
(0.021) 
0.086*** 
(0.029) 
-0.007 
 (0.021) 
Have children aged between 5 and 
14 
0.064 
(0.096) 0.029 
(0.040) 
-0.004 
(0.033) 
-0.007 
(0.021) 
Have children aged below 5  0.047 
(0.153) 
-0.003 
(0.022) 
0.082 
(0.055) 
0.042 
(0.028) 
Differences      
Migrant from English speaking 
country 
-0.029 
(0.113) 
0.003 
(0.038) 
Migrant from non-English speaking 
country 
-0.031 
(0.113) 
-0.078** 
(0.037) 
 
0.159*** 
(0.044) 
-0.071* 
(0.041) 
 
Worked at a firm that employs less -0.184  -0.167***  
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than 5 people (0.122) (0.043) 
Worked at a firm that employs 
between 5-9  
-0.126 
(0.106) 
-0.099 
(0.054) 
-0.102** 
(0.039) 
-0.061 
(0.048) 
Worked at a firm that employs 
between 10-19 people 
-0.171 
(0.108) 
-0.023 
(0.030) 
-0.051 
(0.037) 
-0.002 
(0.031) 
Worked at a firm that employs 
between 20-49 people  
-0.116 
(0.085) 
-0.00004 
(0.023) 
-0.003 
(0.033) 
0.026 
(0.024) 
Industry- Agriculture, forestry and 
fishery 
0.645** 
(0.264)  
-0.254*** 
(0.073)  
Industry- Mining  
0.490** 
(0.219)  
0.546*** 
(0.069)  
Industry- Electricity, gas and water  
-0.006 
(0.267) 
0.304*** 
(0.094) 
0.186 
(0.124) 
0.177** 
(0.070) 
Industry- Construction 
0.339*** 
(0.114) 
0.113*** 
(0.041) 
0.132** 
(0.053) 
0.113** 
(0.044) 
Industry- Wholesale 
-0.015 
(0.157) 
-0.043 
(0.048) 
Industry- Retail 
0.114 
(0.122) 
-0.086*** 
(0.029) 
 
-0.095** 
(0.043) 
-0.059* 
(0.032) 
 
Industry- Accommodation, Cafes 
and Restaurants 
-0.038 
(0.152) 
-0.251*** 
(0.056) 
0.073 
(0.076) 
-0.247*** 
(0.065) 
Industry- Transport 
0.103 
(0.120) 
0.152*** 
(0.051) 
Industry- Communication 
0.219 
(0.181) 
0.074** 
(0.030) 
 
0.196*** 
(0.071) 
0.067** 
(0.032) 
 
Industry- Finance 
-0.447 
(0.549) 
0.233*** 
(0.074) 
-0.029 
(0.078) 
0.271*** 
(0.037) 
Industry- Property& Business 
Services 
0.349** 
(0.164) 
0.028 
(0.035) 
0.001 
(0.058) 
0.164*** 
(0.035) 
Industry- Defence 
-0.040 
(0.177) 
0.176*** 
(0.043) 
0.256*** 
(0.053) 
0.185*** 
(0.034) 
Industry- Education  
0.032 
(0.173) 
-0.246*** 
(0.061) 
-0.056 
(0.088) 
-0.121** 
(0.059) 
Industry- Health  
0.012 
(0.128) 
-0.138*** 
(0.035) 
-0.101** 
(0.046) 
-0.113*** 
(0.037) 
Industry- Cultural & recreational 
Services (dropped) 
-0.091** 
(0.038) 
0.214** 
(0.099) 
-0.103** 
(0.047) 
Industry- Personal & other services  
-0.162 
(0.141)  
0.068 
(0.068)  
Employed on fixed term contract -0.077 
(0.125) 
0.017 
(0.073) 
-0.056 
(0.048) 
0.030 
(0.082) 
Casual worker -0.083 
(0.136) 
-0.025 
(0.059) 
0.010 
(0.045) 
0.144** 
(0.065) 
Constant  
4.869*** 
(0.310) 
5.021*** 
(0.174) 
5.738*** 
(0.127) 
4.600*** 
(0.095) 
N    217 1402 625 1573 
Prob > F   0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
R square 0.4293 NA 0.5417 NA 
Note: ***/**/* denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
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Table A8b: Effects of overskilling on weekly earnings by education level 
Weekly Wages 
Year 11-12/ A-level Certificates 
Explanatory variable 
Australia UK Australia UK 
Severely over-skilled -0.094*** 
(0.029) 
-0.133*** 
(0.035) 
-0.044* 
(0.026) 
-0.094*** 
(0.012) 
Moderately over-skilled 0.008 
(0.021) 
0.001 
(0.028) 
-0.040** 
(0.016) 
-0.012 
(0.010) 
Female -0.159*** 
(0.021) 
-0.135*** 
(0.027) 
-0.095*** 
(0.019) 
-0.150*** 
(0.011) 
Not married (or de facto)   -0.058*** 
(0.022) 
-0.058** 
(0.028) 
-0.106*** 
(0.017) 
-0.046*** 
(0.011) 
Employment tenure- 1-<2 years 
(dropped) 
0.019 
(0.043) 
-0.035 
(0.027) 
0.008 
(0.018) 
Employment tenure- 2-<5 years 0.056* 
(0.030) 
0.042 
(0.038) 
-0.052** 
(0.020) 
0.026* 
(0.016) 
Employment tenure- 5-10 years 0.063* 
(0.034) 
0.069 
(0.046) (dropped) 
0.010 
(0.017) 
Employment tenure- >10 years 0.135*** 
(0.037) 
0.060 
(0.046) 
0.052** 
(0.020) 
0.075*** 
(0.017) 
Hours usually worked in main 
job (weekly) 
0.013*** 
(0.001) 
0.020*** 
(0.002) 
0.013*** 
(0.001) 
0.013*** 
(0.001) 
Age – 18 to  19 years  
0.236* 
(0.122) 
0.592*** 
(0.188) 
0.223 
(0.196) 
0.012 
(0.076) 
Age – 20 to  21 years 
0.446*** 
(0.118) 
0.736*** 
(0.185) 
0.436** 
(0.189) 
0.198*** 
(0.074) 
Age – 22 to  29 years 
0.642*** 
(0.115) 
0.846*** 
(0.182) 
0.570*** 
(0.186) 
0.384*** 
(0.069) 
Age – 30 to  39 years 
0.663*** 
(0.116) 
0.974*** 
(0.184) 
0.624*** 
(0.186) 
0.482*** 
(0.069) 
Age – 40 to  49 years 
0.728*** 
(0.118) 
1.094*** 
(0.185) 
0.647*** 
(0.186) 
0.509*** 
(0.069) 
Age – 50 to  59 years 
0.803*** 
(0.118) 
1.064*** 
(0.186) 
0.666*** 
(0.186) 
 0.523*** 
(0.069) 
Age – 60 to  64 years 
0.729*** 
(0.145) 
0.894*** 
(0.224) 
0.663*** 
(0.190) 
0.431*** 
(0.074) 
Has supervisory role  
0.061*** 
(0.019) 
0.230*** 
(0.028) 
0.091*** 
(0.015) 
0.225*** 
(0.010) 
A Union Member  0.039* 
(0.022) 
-0.101*** 
(0.030) 
0.089*** 
(0.016) 
0.021** 
(0.011) 
Have children aged between 5 
and 14 
-0.003 
(0.027) 
 
0.037 
(0.034) 
0.036* 
(0.019) 
0.015* 
(0.011) 
Have children aged below 5  0.030 
(0.033) 
-0.004 
(0.044) 
0.030 
(0.025) 
0.040*** 
(0.015) 
Differences      
Migrant from English speaking 
country 
0.006 
(0.031) 
0.068*** 
(0.025) 
Migrant from non-English 
speaking country 
-0.070** 
(0.029) 
-0.110* 
(0.057) 
 
-0.040* 
(0.024) 
-0.085*** 
(0.022) 
 
Worked at a firm that employs 
less than 5 people 
-0.194*** 
(0.034)  
-0.184*** 
(0.031)  
Worked at a firm that employs 
between 5-9  
-0.151*** 
(0.034) 
-0.251*** 
(0.067) 
-0.121*** 
(0.025) 
-0.081*** 
(0.027) 
Worked at a firm that employs -0.113*** -0.129*** -0.075*** -0.106*** 
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between 10-19 people (0.028) (0.042) (0.022) (0.017) 
Worked at a firm that employs 
between 20-49 people  
-0.093*** 
(0.027) 
-0.019 
(0.034) 
-0.026 
(0.020) 
-0.035*** 
(0.012) 
Industry- Agriculture, forestry 
and fishery 
-0.159** 
(0.070)  
-0.187*** 
(0.056)  
Industry- Mining  
0.414*** 
(0.078)  
0.293*** 
(0.044)  
Industry- Electricity, gas and 
water  
-0.106 
(0.116) 
0.003 
(0.092) 
0.080 
(0.052) 
0.203*** 
(0.031) 
Industry- Construction 
0.046 
(0.045) 
0.021 
(0.071) 
0.151*** 
(0.031) 
0.092*** 
(0.020) 
Industry- Wholesale 
-0.067 
(0.046) 
0.058 
(0.036) 
Industry- Retail 
-0.174*** 
(0.033) 
-0.115 
(0.057) 
 
-0.139*** 
(0.029) 
-0.116*** 
(0.019) 
 
Industry- Accommodation, Cafes 
and Restaurants 
-0.186*** 
(0.048) 
-0.293*** 
(0.089) 
-0.181*** 
(0.045) 
-0.352*** 
(0.035) 
Industry- Transport 
-0.003 
(0.042) 
0.079** 
(0.034) 
Industry- Communication 
0.039 
(0.050) 
0.040 
(0.059) 
 
0.018 
(0.045) 
0.011 
(0.019) 
 
Industry- Finance 
0.180*** 
(0.045) 
0.169*** 
(0.050) 
0.148*** 
(0.042) 
0.229*** 
(0.020) 
Industry- Property& Business 
Services 
0.101*** 
(0.038) 
0.224*** 
(0.052) 
0.066* 
(0.035) 
0.144*** 
(0.018) 
Industry- Defence 
0.015 
(0.041) 
0.199*** 
(0.050) 
0.024 
(0.031) 
0.121*** 
(0.019) 
Industry- Education  
0.012 
(0.055) 
-0.013 
(0.074) 
-0.062* 
(0.036) 
0.018 
(0.022) 
Industry- Health  
-0.146*** 
(0.044) 
-0.179*** 
(0.054) 
-0.139*** 
(0.029) 
-0.022 
(0.017) 
Industry- Cultural & recreational 
Services 
-0.089 
(0.066) 
0.032 
(0.065) 
-0.011 
(0.047) 
-0.053** 
(0.023) 
Industry- Personal & other 
services  
-0.117** 
(0.053)  
0.022 
(0.035)  
Employed on fixed term contract -0.033 
(0.036) 
-0.033 
(0.065) 
-0.006 
(0.027) 
-0.007** 
(0.031) 
Casual worker -0.033 
(0.042) 
-0.023 
(0.079) 
0.007 
(0.037) 
-0.077 
(0.035) 
Constant  
5.538*** 
(0.135) 
4.069*** 
(0.210) 
5.599*** 
(0.192) 
4.814*** 
(0.077) 
N  1123 842 2075 5815 
Prob > F   0.0000 0.0000   0.0000   0.0000 
R square 0.4866 NA 0.4227 NA 
Note: ***/**/* denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
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Table A8c: Effects of overskilling on weekly earnings by education level 
Weekly Wages 
Undergraduates Postgraduates 
Explanatory variable 
Australia UK Australia UK 
Severely over-skilled -0.159*** 
(0.034) 
-0.203*** 
(0.016) 
-0.157 
(0.124) 
-0.183*** 
(0.028) 
Moderately over-skilled -0.003 
(0.020) 
-0.058*** 
(0.014) 
-0.077 
(0.054) 
-0.096*** 
(0.025) 
Female -0.115*** 
(0.019) 
-0.102*** 
(0.013) 
-0.111** 
(0.050) 
-0.141*** 
(0.023) 
Not married (or de facto)   -0.026 
(0.021) 
-0.053*** 
(0.014) 
-0.071 
(0.057) 
-0.080*** 
(0.025) 
Employment tenure- 1-<2 years 
(dropped) 
0.052** 
(0.021) 
-0.037 
(0.081) 
0.062* 
(0.037) 
Employment tenure- 2-<5 years 0.064** 
(0.031) 
0.098*** 
(0.018) 
-0.018 
(0.059) 
0.092*** 
(0.033) 
Employment tenure- 5-10 years 0.123*** 
(0.033) 
0.075*** 
(0.021) (dropped) 
0.035 
(0.038) 
Employment tenure- >10 years 0.134*** 
(0.035) 
0.138*** 
(0.022) 
-0.061 
(0.061) 
0.105*** 
(0.039) 
Hours usually worked in main 
job (weekly) 
0.015*** 
(0.001) 
0.016*** 
(0.001) 
0.011*** 
(0.002) 
0.013*** 
(0.001) 
Age – 18 to  19 years  (dropped) 
-0.623*** 
(0.195) (dropped) 
-0.652 
(0.307) 
Age – 20 to  21 years 
-0.111 
(0.188) 
-0.600*** 
(0.145) (dropped) 
-0.398 
(0.308) 
Age – 22 to  29 years 
-0.157 
(0.097) 
-0.297** 
(0.134) 
0.049 
(0.192) 
-0.095 
(0.251) 
Age – 30 to  39 years 
-0.038 
(0.096) 
-0.083 
(0.134) 
0.237 
(0.154) 
0.080 
(0.250) 
Age – 40 to  49 years 
0.0001 
 (0.096) 
-0.020 
(0.134) 
0.414*** 
(0.152) 
0.140 
(0.251) 
Age – 50 to  59 years 
0.038 
(0.096) 
0.002 
(0.134) 
0.404*** 
(0.148) 
0.216 
(0.251) 
Age – 60 to  64 years (dropped) 
-0.078 
(0.146) (dropped) 
0.166 
(0.268) 
Has supervisory role  
0.111*** 
(0.020) 
0.218*** 
(0.013) 
0.145*** 
(0.050) 
0.225*** 
(0.023) 
A Union Member  0.001 
(0.022) 
-0.032** 
(0.015) 
-0.063 
(0.051) 
0.001 
(0.026) 
Have children aged between 5 
and 14 
0.040* 
(0.023) 
 
-0.004 
(0.016) 
-0.001 
(0.054) 
-0.029 
(0.026) 
Have children aged below 5  0.040 
(0.029) 
0.036* 
(0.019) 
0.016 
(0.076) 
0.038 
(0.035) 
Differences      
Migrant from English speaking 
country 
0.046 
(0.028) 
-0.045 
(0.067) 
Migrant from non-English 
speaking country 
-0.088*** 
(0.025) 
-0.037 
(0.024) 
 
-0.023 
(0.060) 
-0.008 
(0.040) 
 
Worked at a firm that employs 
less than 5 people 
-0.225*** 
(0.046)  
-0.995*** 
(0.304)  
Worked at a firm that employs 
between 5-9  
-0.141*** 
(0.040) 
-0.246*** 
(0.037) 
-0.207* 
(0.108) 
-0.145* 
(0.078) 
Worked at a firm that employs -0.130*** -0.121*** -0.197** -0.157*** 
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between 10-19 people (0.031) (0.024) (0.086) (0.056) 
Worked at a firm that employs 
between 20-49 people  
-0.074*** 
(0.022) 
-0.051*** 
(0.016) 
-0.053 
(0.074) 
-0.062** 
(0.031) 
Industry- Agriculture, forestry 
and fishery 
-0.117 
(0.086)  
-0.091 
(0.173)  
Industry- Mining  
0.408*** 
(0.098)  
0.492* 
(0.281)  
Industry- Electricity, gas and 
water  
-0.051 
(0.132) 
0.072* 
(0.038) 
0.232 
(0.181) 
-0.047 
(0.119) 
Industry- Construction 
-0.015 
(0.069) 
0.059* 
(0.031) 
0.355 
(0.221) 
0.013 
(0.078) 
Industry- Wholesale 
0.077 
(0.073) 
0.773*** 
(0.213) 
Industry- Retail 
-0.065 
(0.054) 
-0.164*** 
(0.033) 
 
-0.034 
(0.270) 
-0.224 
(0.081) 
 
Industry- Accommodation, Cafes 
and Restaurants 
0.238* 
(0.130) 
-0.523*** 
(0.057) 
-0.019 
(0.248) 
-0.592*** 
(0.126) 
Industry- Transport 
0.120* 
(0.062) 
0.346 
(0.400) 
Industry- Communication 
0.125* 
(0.074) 
-0.008 
(0.035) 
 
0.074 
(0.135) 
-0.192*** 
(0.080) 
 
Industry- Finance 
0.292*** 
(0.043) 
0.143*** 
(0.030) 
0.403*** 
(0.112) 
0.188** 
(0.065) 
Industry- Property& Business 
Services 
0.132*** 
(0.036) 
0.151*** 
(0.022) 
0.091 
(0.106) 
0.082*** 
(0.049) 
Industry- Defence 
0.101** 
(0.040) 
-0.051** 
(0.026) 
0.175* 
(0.096) 
-0.006* 
(0.055) 
Industry- Education  
-0.110*** 
(0.038) 
-0.029 
(0.025) 
0.110 
(0.093) 
-0.072 
(0.049) 
Industry- Health  
-0.010 
(0.040) 
-0.057** 
(0.025) 
0.146 
(0.111) 
0.012 
(0.053) 
Industry- Cultural & recreational 
Services 
-0.126** 
(0.062) 
-0.047 
(0.030) 
-0.154 
(0.174) 
-0.036 
(0.061) 
Industry- Personal & other 
services  
-0.283*** 
(0.066)  
0.342* 
(0.185)  
Employed on fixed term contract 0.102*** 
(0.030) 
-0.005 
(0.031) 
0.082 
(0.060) 
-0.069 
(0.043) 
Casual worker -0.234*** 
(0.056) 
-0.104*** 
(0.039) 
-0.212 
(0.173) 
-0.168** 
(0.070) 
Constant  
6.328*** 
(0.118) 
5.621*** 
(0.141) 
6.312*** 
(0.225) 
5.731*** 
(0.261) 
N  1490 3437 308 1168 
Prob > F   0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
R square 0.4227 NA 0.3722 NA 
Note: ***/**/* denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
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Table A9: Effects of overskilling on weekly earnings by gender (for full-time working age) 
Males Females Explanatory variable 
Australia  UK Australia  UK  
Severely over-skilled -0.095*** 
(0.019) 
-0.124*** 
(0.010) 
-0.057*** 
(0.022) 
-0.114*** 
(0.012) 
Moderately over-skilled -0.015 
(0.013) 
-0.024** 
(0.009) 
-0.038*** 
(0.014) 
-0.040*** 
(0.010) 
Educational attainment –  
Year 10  
0.070** 
(0.031) 
0.171*** 
(0.017) 
0.135*** 
(0.036) 
0.235*** 
(0.021) 
Educational attainment –  
Year 11 to 12 
0.177*** 
(0.029) 
0.293*** 
(0.022) 
0.172*** 
(0.035) 
0.328*** 
(0.024) 
Educational attainment – 
Certificate / diploma 
0.183*** 
(0.027) 
0.244*** 
(0.014) 
0.210*** 
(0.034) 
0.318*** 
(0.018) 
Educational attainment – 
Undergraduate 
0.415*** 
(0.030) 
0.523*** 
(0.016) 
0.414*** 
(0.035) 
0.590*** 
(0.020) 
Educational attainment – 
Postgraduate 
0.510*** 
(0.038) 
0.662*** 
(0.020) 
0.517*** 
(0.046) 
0.697*** 
(0.024) 
Not married (or de facto)   -0.090*** 
(0.015) 
-0.092*** 
(0.010) 
-0.026* 
(0.014) 
-0.008 
(0.009) 
Employment tenure- 1-<2 years -0.045** 
(0.021) 
0.037** 
(0.016) (dropped) 
0.021 
(0.015) 
Employment tenure- 2-5 years -0.042*** 
(0.015) 
0.076*** 
(0.014) 
0.045** 
(0.022) 
0.051*** 
(0.014) 
Employment tenure- 5-10 years 
(dropped) 
0.052*** 
(0.015) 
0.088*** 
(0.023) 
0.048*** 
(0.015) 
Employment tenure- >10 years 0.030* 
(0.016) 
0.117*** 
(0.015) 
0.133*** 
(0.025) 
0.100*** 
(0.016) 
Hours usually worked in main job 
(weekly) 
0.014*** 
(0.001) 
0.012*** 
(0.001) 
0.014*** 
(0.001) 
0.015*** 
(0.001) 
Age – 18 to  19 years  
0.101 
(0.104) 
-0.102 
(0.069) 
0.273*** 
(0.095) 
0.186*** 
(0.063) 
Age – 20 to  21 years 
0.291*** 
(0.101) 
0.031 
(0.066) 
0.432*** 
(0.088) 
0.324*** 
(0.060) 
Age – 22 to  29 years 
0.458*** 
(0.097) 
0.191*** 
(0.061) 
0.589*** 
(0.084) 
0.473*** 
(0.057) 
Age – 30 to  39 years 
0.537*** 
(0.097) 
0.352*** 
(0.061) 
0.661*** 
(0.084) 
0.600*** 
(0.057) 
Age – 40 to  49 years 
0.587*** 
(0.097) 
0.407*** 
(0.061) 
0.652*** 
(0.084) 
0.629*** 
(0.057) 
Age – 50 to  59 years 
0.630*** 
(0.098) 
0.437*** 
(0.061) 
0.657*** 
(0.084) 
0.621*** 
(0.057) 
Age – 60 to  64 years 
0.586*** 
(0.102) 
0.345*** 
(0.064) 
0.644*** 
(0.095) 
(dropped) 
Has supervisory role  
0.088*** 
(0.012) 
0.235*** 
(0.009) 
0.074*** 
(0.013) 
0.196*** 
(0.010) 
A Union Member  0.067*** 
(0.013) 
-0.017* 
(0.009) 
0.028* 
(0.015) 
0.044*** 
(0.010) 
Have children aged between 5 and 
14 
0.049*** 
(0.015) 
0.039*** 
(0.010) 
-0.055*** 
(0.017) 
-0.057*** 
(0.011) 
Have children aged below 5  0.034* 
(0.018) 
0.035*** 
(0.012) 
0.011 
(0.032) 
0.050*** 
(0.018) 
Differences      
Migrant from English speaking 
country 
0.022 
(0.019) 
0.038* 
(0.021) 
Migrant from non-English 
speaking country 
-0.032* 
(0.018) 
 
-0.088*** 
(0.018) -0.040** 
(0.020) 
 
-0.031* 
(0.018) 
 41
Worked at a firm that employs less 
than 5 people 
-0.191*** 
(0.024) 
 -0.225*** 
(0.028) 
 
Worked at a firm that employs 
between 5-9 people 
-0.160*** 
(0.021) 
-0.133*** 
(0.025) 
-0.097*** 
(0.023) 
-0.117*** 
(0.024) 
Worked at a firm that employs 
between 10-19 people 
-0.130*** 
(0.018) 
-0.095***a  
(0.016) 
-0.074*** 
(0.021) 
-0.103***a  
(0.015) 
Worked at a firm that employs 
between 20-49 people  
-0.061*** 
(0.016) 
-0.025**b  
(0.011) 
-0.061*** 
(0.017) 
-0.054***b  
(0.011) 
Industry- Agriculture, forestry and 
fishery 
-0.117*** 
(0.040) 
 -0.441*** 
(0.070)  
Industry- Mining  
0.360*** 
(0.035) 
 0.218* 
(0.114)  
Industry- Electricity, gas and water  
0.061 
(0.046) 
0.146*** 
(0.025) 
0.064 
(0.097) 
0.132*** 
(0.039) 
Industry- Construction 
0.149*** 
(0.025) 
0.086*** 
(0.017) 
0.047 
(0.049) 
0.087*** 
(0.029) 
Industry- Wholesale 
-0.009 
(0.029) 
0.073* 
(0.039) 
Industry- Retail 
-0.122*** 
(0.023) 
-0.091*** 
(0.016) 
 
-0.126*** 
(0.030) 
-0.132*** 
(0.021) 
 
Industry- Accommodation, Cafes 
and Restaurants 
-0.151*** 
(0.038) 
-0.381*** 
(0.033) 
-0.074* 
(0.041) 
-0.300*** 
(0.034) 
Industry- Transport 
0.089*** 
(0.026) 
-0.004 
(0.044) 
Industry- Communication 
0.046 
(0.033) 
0.006 
(0.015) 
 
0.097** 
(0.047) 
0.072*** 
(0.025) 
 
Industry- Finance 
0.302*** 
(0.031) 
0.243*** 
(0.019) 
0.116*** 
(0.032) 
0.182*** 
(0.021) 
Industry- Property& Business 
Services 
0.140*** 
(0.024) 
0.154*** 
(0.015) 
0.074** 
(0.029) 
0.164*** 
(0.019) 
Industry- Defence 
0.030 
(0.024) 
0.081*** 
(0.016) 
0.163*** 
(0.031) 
0.088*** 
(0.020) 
Industry- Education  
-0.162*** 
(0.028) 
-0.061*** 
(0.020) 
-0.005 
(0.028) 
0.036* 
(0.020) 
Industry- Health  
-0.164*** 
(0.029) 
-0.041** 
(0.019) 
-0.033 
(0.026) 
-0.022 
(0.017) 
Industry- Cultural & recreational 
Services 
-0.088** 
(0.038) 
-0.085*** 
(0.019) 
0.058 
(0.052) 
0.017 
(0.024) 
Industry- Personal & other services  
-0.037 
(0.030) 
- -0.097** 
(0.042) 
- 
Employed on fixed term  
0.033 
(0.021) 
-0.050* 
(0.025) 
-0.012 
(0.023) 
0.007 
(0.024) 
Casual worker 
-0.026 
(0.029) 
-0.090*** 
(0.028) 
-0.066** 
(0.030) 
-0.048 
(0.030) 
Constant  5.492*** 
(0.106) 
4.733*** 
(0. 068) 
5.160*** 
(0.099) 
4.157*** 
(0.067) 
Sample size 3653 8107 2185 6130 
Prob > F  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
R square 0.4741 NA 0.4989 NA 
Note: ***/**/* denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Standard errors in parentheses.  
 
a For UK, the variable is “Worked at a firm that employs between 10-24 people”  
b For UK, the variable is “Worked at a firm that employs between 25-49 people” 
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